

Uncertainty


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Random Variable




State Space

$$\Omega = \{outcome_1, outcome_2, \dots, outcome_n\}$$


Random Variable

$$X = x_i \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, n$$

Event



Event



Self-Information

$$\underline{I(x_i)} = \log\left(\frac{1}{P(x_i)}\right) = -\log \underline{P(x_i)}$$

Unit = bits \log_2
Unit = nats \log_e

Probability of
the event $X = x_i$

Self-information 

Probability 

A Priori and a Posteriori

Two types of knowledge, justification, or arguments

A Priori - “from the earlier”

independent of experience

“All bachelors are unmarried”

A Posteriori - “from the later”

Dependent on experience or empirical evidence

“Some bachelors are happy”

Bayes' Rule (1)

| means "given"
H : Hypothesis
E : Evidence

The **prior probability**
the probability of **H**
before **E** is observed.

The **likelihood**
of observing **E** given **H**

$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H) \cdot P(H)}{P(E)}$$

The **posterior probability**
the probability of **H** given **E**,
i.e., after **E** is observed.

the **marginal likelihood**
or "**model evidence**"
the same for all possible hypotheses

Bayes' Rule (2)

$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H) \cdot P(H)}{P(E)}$$

$P(H)$, the **prior probability** –
the probability of **H** before **E** is observed.

This indicates one's *preconceived beliefs* about how likely different **hypotheses** are, **absent evidence** regarding the instance under study.

$P(H|E)$, the **posterior probability** –
the probability of **H** given **E**, i.e., **after E** is observed.
the probability of a **hypothesis given** the observed **evidence**


$P(E|H)$, the probability of observing **E given H**, is also known as the **likelihood**.
It indicates the **compatibility** of the **evidence** with the **given hypothesis**.

$P(E)$, the **marginal likelihood** or "model evidence". This factor is the **same** for all possible hypotheses being considered. This means that this factor does not enter into determining the relative probabilities of different hypotheses.

Bayes' Rule (3)

| means “given”
H : Hypothesis
E : Evidence

$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H) \cdot P(H)}{P(E)}$$



The **posterior probability**
the probability of **H** given **E**,
i.e., **after** **E** is observed.

The **likelihood**
of observing **E** given **H**

The **prior probability**
the probability of **H**
before **E** is observed.

Example

If the **Evidence** doesn't match up with a **Hypothesis**, one should reject the **Hypothesis**.
But if a **Hypothesis** is extremely unlikely a priori, one should also reject it,
even if the **Evidence** does appear to match up.

$$\frac{P(E|H)}{P(H)} \ll$$

Three **Hypotheses** about the nature of a newborn baby of a friend, including:

- **H1**: the baby is a brown-haired boy
- **H2**: the baby is a blond-haired girl.
- **H3**: the baby is a dog.

Consider two scenarios:

I'm presented with **Evidence** in the form of a picture of a blond-haired baby girl.
I find this **Evidence** supports **H2** and opposes **H1** and **H3**.

I'm presented with **Evidence** in the form of a picture of a baby dog.
I don't find this **Evidence** supports **H3**,
since my prior belief in this **Hypothesis** (that a human can give birth to a dog) is extremely small.

Bayes' rule

a principled way of combining new **Evidence** with prior **beliefs**, through the application of Bayes' rule.
can be applied iteratively: after observing some **Evidence**, the resulting posterior probability can then be
treated as a prior probability, and a new posterior probability computed from new **Evidence**.
Bayesian updating.

Posterior Probability Example (1)

Suppose there are two full bowls of cookies.

Bowl #1 has 10 chocolate chip and 30 plain cookies, while **bowl #2** has 20 of each.

When **picking a bowl** at random, and then **picking a cookie** at random.

No reason to treat one bowl differently from another, likewise for the cookies.

The drawn cookie turns out to be a plain one.

How probable is it from bowl #1?

more than a half, since there are more plain cookies in bowl #1.

The precise answer

Let **H1** correspond to bowl #1, and **H2** to bowl #2. $P(H1)=P(H2)=0.5$.


The event **E** is the observation of a plain cookie.

From the contents of the bowls, $P(E|H1) = 30/40 = 0.75$ and $P(E|H2) = 20/40 = 0.5$.

Bayes' formula then yields

$$P(H1|E) = \frac{P(E|H1) \cdot P(H1)}{P(E|H1)P(H1) + P(E|H2)P(H2)} = \frac{0.75 \times 0.5}{0.75 \times 0.5 + 0.5 \times 0.5} = 0.6$$

Posterior Probability Example (2)



$$P(H1|E)$$


$$= \frac{P(E|H1) \cdot P(H1)}{P(E|H1)P(H1) + P(E|H2)P(H2)}$$

$$= \frac{0.75 \times 0.5}{0.75 \times 0.5 + 0.5 \times 0.5} = 0.6$$

$$P(E) = P(E|H1)P(H1) + P(E|H2)P(H2)$$


$$P(H1|E) = \frac{P(E|H1) \cdot P(H1)}{P(E)}$$

Posterior Probability Example (3)



$$P(H1|E) = \frac{P(E|H1) \cdot P(H1)}{P(E|H1)P(H1) + P(E|H2)P(H2)} = \frac{0.75 \times 0.5}{0.75 \times 0.5 + 0.5 \times 0.5} = 0.6$$

Posterior Probability Example (4)



Maintain Magnetic Field

Storing Magnetic Energy

Dissipate Magnetic Energy

References

[1] <http://en.wikipedia.org/>

[2] R Bose, Information Theory Coding and Cryptography, 2003